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Hogpass vs OpenClaw

OpenClaw gives one person an agent with the run of their machine. Hogpass gives a company one per employee, with nothing it can steal.

Updated

The short version

OpenClaw is the best personal AI agent there is, and by design it is one install per person holding that person's real API keys in plaintext. OneCLI is that idea a company can deploy: one agent per employee, each in its own sandbox, each reaching services through a gateway that injects credentials at the wire. The agent never holds a key. One person on your own machine, install OpenClaw. Forty people and someone has to answer for what the agents did, that is us.

Credit first. Peter Steinberger's OpenClaw went from weekend project to the most-starred repository on GitHub in under five months, and nearly everything in this category, ours included, exists downstream of it. It is free, open source, and its channel coverage is broader than ours. So this page is not about whether OpenClaw is good. It is about what changes when you stop installing it once and start installing it forty times.

OneCLI compared with OpenClaw

The problem is the fortieth install, not the first

On one machine, OpenClaw's design is coherent. The agent is you: it holds your keys because you hold your keys, and if it does something you did not want, you are the one who finds out. The trust boundary is your laptop, and you already trusted your laptop.

A company does not have that boundary. Forty installs means forty unmanaged machines and forty copies of credentials in config files. Nobody can answer "which agent touched the billing API last Tuesday," because the answer lives in forty places and none of them are yours. When someone leaves, their agent keeps its keys until a human remembers to rotate them.

Sandboxing helps and OpenClaw has some. What a container does not solve is the credential: the key is still inside the box with the agent, so anything that can talk the agent into echoing it walks out with it. Containment limits what the agent breaks locally. It does not limit what a stolen key does afterwards, from anywhere.

What we changed

The agent boots with placeholder credentials, including the model key. The gateway splices in the real secret at the network boundary on the way out, so there is nothing in the sandbox worth stealing and "stop using the proxy" is not an option the agent has. Everything it does leaves as an HTTP request, so one place sees all of it: MCP calls, CLI commands, curl, and code the agent wrote thirty seconds ago. That is where policy runs. Allow, block, rate limit, or hold for a human, per request, scoped to the employee whose agent it is.

The model

Built for

onecli

A company: one agent per employee, provisioned centrally in its own sandbox

OpenClaw

A person: one agent on your own machine, installed and updated by you
Everything below follows from this. Neither answer is wrong for the other's user.
Setup per person

onecli

They log in. The agent already has the company's tools and skills

OpenClaw

Install, onboard, choose a model, paste in each API key
The install is easy. Doing it forty times, with credentials, is not.
Tenancy

onecli

Multi-tenant. One deployment holds the whole org, and a new hire is a new user rather than a new install

OpenClaw

Single-tenant by design. One install per person, each one a machine somebody has to keep updated
Correct for one hacker, and the reason the fortieth install is a different problem from the first.

Credentials

What the agent holds

onecli

Placeholders. Real keys are injected at the wire, including the model key

OpenClaw

Your real keys, in plaintext config on the machine it runs on
A prompt injection can only exfiltrate what is present, and nothing is.
Blast radius of a bad turn

onecli

A disposable sandbox, plus exactly the API calls policy allowed

OpenClaw

The machine, and every account whose key is on it
Containers bound the local damage, not what a stolen key does later.
Offboarding

onecli

Revoke the person. Their agent stops resolving credentials on the next request

OpenClaw

Find the machine, rotate every key that was on it
Nothing was handed out, so there is nothing to chase down.

Control

Where guardrails live

onecli

At the network. Every request is evaluated, whatever produced it: MCP calls, CLI commands, curl from a shell, or code written at runtime

OpenClaw

In the loop: command approval prompts and DM pairing, covering configured tools and shell commands
Agents reach APIs four ways. A gate on one is a gate with three doors beside it.
Per-request verdicts

onecli

Allow, block, rate limit, or hold for human approval, per request and per connection

OpenClaw

Approve or deny a command, decided by the person at the keyboard
Rules set once beat a prompt answered under time pressure.
Scoping between people

onecli

Each agent reaches only what its person already has. Support cannot reach payroll

OpenClaw

One user, one machine, no notion of an org to scope against
Not a gap in OpenClaw. It is single-user software and says so.
Audit trail

onecli

One log across every agent: who asked, what was called, what was injected, what was denied

OpenClaw

Local logs on each machine, readable by that machine's owner
A fleet needs one answer to "what happened," not forty partial ones.

Day to day

Where you talk to it

onecli

Web, terminal, and Slack

OpenClaw

WhatsApp, Telegram, Discord, Slack, Signal, iMessage, email, voice
OpenClaw wins this outright.
Price and community

onecli

Paid per user and agent, with a free Apache-2.0 edition you can self-host on your own hardware

OpenClaw

Free forever, open source under a non-profit foundation, with a contributor base we will not match
We are asking to be paid for the fleet, not for the agent.

When to use which

Use OpenClaw when

  • ·It is for you, on your machine, with your own accounts
  • ·You want it in WhatsApp, Signal, or iMessage today
  • ·You enjoy configuring your own agent and want to change how it works
  • ·Free matters more than a shared audit trail

Use OneCLI when

  • ·More than a handful of people need an agent and nobody wants to install it on each machine
  • ·Company credentials would otherwise end up in plaintext on employee laptops
  • ·Someone has to be able to answer which agent did what, in one place
  • ·Some actions must be blocked or held for a human by rule, not by prompt
  • ·Each person's agent should reach only what that person already has
  • ·The whole system has to run on your own infrastructure, with source you can read

Common questions

Is OneCLI a fork of OpenClaw?

No. Different codebase, different shape. The overlap is the idea that an agent should have real hands, which OpenClaw is largely responsible for making obvious.

Can't I just run OpenClaw in a container and be fine?

You will be safer, and it is worth doing. But the credentials are still inside the box, so a prompt injection can read them and use them from anywhere afterwards. That is the part we fixed by never putting them there.

Does OneCLI still work with OpenClaw?

Yes. Point any agent's HTTPS_PROXY at the gateway and its credentials get injected per request, with the same policies and audit log. A good way to get the credential boundary without changing the agent your team likes.

What does OpenClaw do better?

Channels, community, and price. It reaches more platforms, has a contributor base we will not match, and is free. It is also more hackable, because it runs on a machine you fully control, which is the same property that makes it hard to deploy at a company.

Is OneCLI open source too?

Yes, Apache-2.0 outside the ee/ directories, and you can run the whole system on your own hardware with nothing leaving your network. OpenClaw is the more permissive licence and the larger community. The difference is what you operate: one multi-tenant deployment for the org, rather than one install per person.

Do employees lose the parts that make a personal agent good?

No. Each agent has its own memory, skills, and scope, and nobody else on the team can see them. What is shared is the company layer: skills, MCP servers, and CLIs built once and inherited by everyone.

How does this compare to Hermes, the other open-source personal agent?

Very similarly. Hermes documents its trust model explicitly and ships more sandboxing options, so it is the more security-conscious of the two. The credential still lives in the box either way. We wrote that comparison out separately.

The longer version of the enforcement argument is in why an MCP gateway cannot see most of what your agent does, the nearest alternative is OneCLI vs Hermes, and the shape of the product is on the product page.

Also compared

OneCLI vs Claude TagAnthropic built the same credential architecture we did. The difference is whose permissions the agent carries: a Slack channel's, or an employee's.OneCLI vs HermesHermes is a single-tenant personal agent that holds your credentials. OneCLI is one agent per employee, and the sandbox holds none.

Try it

Be greedy about AI. Never about access.

$ curl -fsSL hogpass.com/install | sh